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Abstract
The rhetoric surrounding regulatory reform has long been heated.
Supporters talk about making regulation more efficient and regulators
more accountable to the public. Opponents blame regulatory reforms
for crippling the regulatory process and inhibiting the production of
regulations that will protect public health. This Article uses a data
set of regulations and regulatory reforms in twenty-eight states to
question both of these positions. We find that reforms such as
executive review of regulations, legislative review of regulations, and
economic analysis have no relationship with regulatory output.
Instead, political factors, particularly the control of the state
legislature, are a much better predictor of the volume of regulation in
a state. If a legislature passes laws that require regulations, there will
be more regulations regardless of the procedural hurdles that
regulatory agencies face when engaging in the regulatory process.
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Introduction
The 113th Congress has considered nearly three-dozen bills that
would change the federal regulatory process.1 The fifty states have
been extremely active in passing similar bills, particularly since the
onset of the Great Recession.2 Many of these bills add requirements
that agencies must follow when promulgating a regulation. These
bills, often described as “regulatory reforms,” are largely a response to
claims that regulatory agencies are stifling the economy by
promulgating too many regulations that kill jobs and hurt the
economy.
1.

Regulatory Studies Ctr., Regulatory Reform Bills, 113th Congress, Geo.
Wash. U., http://research.columbian.gwu.edu/regulatorystudies/regreform
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Regulatory Studies Ctr.].

2.

See generally Jason A. Schwartz, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, 52
Experiments with Regulatory Review: The Political and
Economic Inputs into State Rulemakings (2010) (surveying the
regulatory practices of all 50 states).
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But do the regulatory reforms work? What does it even mean for
regulatory reforms to “work”? At the most basic level, we would
expect regulatory reforms to have a substantive impact on policy
decisions made by regulating agencies. By raising the cost faced by
agencies to create regulations, regulatory reforms should also dampen
the output of regulations. Indeed, opponents of regulatory reforms
have made this argument repeatedly.3 If these reforms perform neither
of these functions, then they may serve a political purpose, ensuring
that political officeholders pay attention to particular regulations that
create dissatisfaction for affected constituencies.4 Finally, reforms may
play a symbolic role imbuing the regulatory process with values such
as public participation, democratic oversight, or economic efficiency.
Determining which of these roles are played by regulatory reforms
is increasingly important. As legislators and executives enact more
and more regulatory reforms, they justify them by arguing that they
have a substantive impact on regulations or that they will reduce
regulatory volume.5 This rhetoric is often particularly heated
regarding environmental regulations. Once put into place, new
regulatory procedures are rarely repealed. If some regulatory reforms
are working to curb regulation and others are not, then this will
inform the debate over new reforms. If they are instead playing only a
political and/or symbolic role, then this should raise questions about
their continual appeal.
In this article, we use a unique data set that contains information
on the volume of regulation and the varying levels of regulatory
procedures in twenty-eight states. The states have been underutilized
in the empirical examination of the regulatory process. Much of the
extant literature focuses on the federal regulatory process. This
3.

See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992) (arguing that
increasingly burdensome requirements are slowing and rigidifying agency
rulemaking).

4.

Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 243, 244 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al.,
Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
Va. L. Rev. 431, 440–43 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process].

5.

See, e.g., Charles S. Clark, House Backs Bill to Rein in Regulations,
Gov’t Executive, (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.govexec.com/
oversight/2013/08/house-backs-bill-rein-regulations/68018/?oref=river
(explaining that Rep. Sam Graves, R-MO, cited the cost of regulations
as justification for the REINS Act, which imposes more requirements on
regulatory agencies).
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literature raises serious questions about the role of regulatory reforms
(often called “procedural controls”). However, since there is always
just one political context at the federal level, determining the
relationship between politics, procedures, and regulatory output is
challenging. By looking across twenty-eight states, we hope to cast
new insight on how regulatory reforms function in practice.
We find that much of the skepticism about the effectiveness of
regulatory reform is warranted and much of the rhetoric (on both
sides of the political spectrum) is overblown. The presence of
regulatory procedures appears to have no correlation with the volume
of regulation. Instead, one can predict regulatory volume (and likely
the content of regulations) much more accurately by seeing who has
power at any given time. Democratic legislatures pass statutes that
require more regulations than legislatures controlled by Republicans.
These regulations then get issued regardless of the procedural
environment. Regulatory reforms may facilitate control of regulatory
agencies by existing coalitions of political leaders, but they are
unlikely necessary to ensure this control.
This Article will proceed as follows. In the next Part, we review
both the theoretical claims advanced to explain regulatory reforms
and the empirical examinations of their actual role. In Part III, we
describe our data set. We present the analysis of the data from the
twenty-eight states in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, we ruminate on the
implications of these findings for future debates on regulatory reform
and for political control of the administrative state.

I.

The Intent(s) of Regulatory Reform

The idea of manipulating the regulatory process in order to affect
regulatory decisions is as old as the administrative state itself.6 The
Administrative Procedure Act7 was passed in 1946, in part, as a
response to the growth in power of the executive branch during the
New Deal.8 The proceduralization of the rulemaking process picked up
steam as a reaction to the boom in social regulation in the late 1960s
and 1970s.9
The procedures put in place for agencies to follow when
promulgating a regulation were regularly justified with high-minded
6.

Marc Allen Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition 10 (2d
ed. 2000).

7.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).

8.

Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How
Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 10–13, 49–50
(4th ed. 2010).

9.

Eisner, supra note 6, at 118–30.
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rhetoric and substantive goals. Notice-and-comment rulemaking
(requiring an agency to publish a proposed rule, accept public
comments, and respond to those comments) was put in place to
ensure that bureaucratic decisions would be influenced by public
input.10 Requirements for presidential or congressional oversight were
meant to further democratic governance of bureaucratic agencies
otherwise sheltered from it.11 The demand that agencies perform
economic analysis on their regulations with large economic impacts
was accompanied by rhetoric about the need to make regulation more
efficient.12 Particular interests, especially small businesses, were given
procedures all their own in order to make up for disadvantages not
mitigated by other procedures.13
Those implementing regulatory reforms, however, may have goals
that are more political than substantive. The idea that procedures put
in place by legislatures or executives were means of securing lasting
political influence for the coalition that enacted them was most
prominently put forth by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (commonly
referred to as “McNollgast”).14 They argued that enacting coalitions of
political actors attempted to ensure that future agency actions
comported with the enacting coalition’s preference. The political
actors did so by creating a procedural environment that would
recreate the interest group environment faced by the enacting
coalition. Such a procedural environment (called “deck-stacking” by
McNollgast) would lead to agency decisions that mirrored the
preferences of the enacting coalition.15 The McNollgast framework was
expanded upon by numerous scholars.16 Huber and Shipan
10.

Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary
Inquiry 65–66 (1969).

11.

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245,
2255, 2332 (2001).

12.

See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis
Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. Econ. Persp. 67, 79–80 (2008)
(arguing that even though the authors found that economic analyses
have little effect on regulations, such analyses should still be performed
because of the potential to make more economically efficient policy
decisions).

13.

Stuart Shapiro, Defragmenting the Regulatory Process, 31 Risk
Analysis 893, 897–98 (2011).

14.

McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 4, at 246.

15.

Id. at 261–63.

16.

See, e.g., John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan & Madelaine Pfahler,
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
330 (2001); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing
Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 91 (1994).
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acknowledge that “scholars seem to agree that the use of procedural
rather than policy details represents the most important way in which
congressional majorities use legislation to influence bureaucratic
autonomy.” 17
The usefulness of procedural controls as a means of controlling
bureaucratic discretion has its critics however. Most relevantly, Horn
and Shepsle argue that such controls limit agency drift (bureaucratic
preferences that deviate from those of the enacting coalition) by
empowering future political actors or existing coalitions. These later
policymakers may have different preferences than the enacting
coalition, leading to “coalitional drift.” In fact, the existing coalition
may use the procedural controls put in place by the enacting coalition
to achieve their own policy goals.18
Legal scholars have posited another impact and possible intent of
regulatory reforms. McGarity popularized the theory that regulatory
procedures, coupled with “hard look” judicial review of agency
regulations, has ossified the regulatory process.19 Regulatory
procedures have raised the costs of agency rulemaking to such an
extent that agencies were avoiding issuing regulations and turning to
other less burdensome means of setting policy that were free of such
constraints (such as enforcement actions or guidance documents).20
McGarity leaves unanswered the question of whether crippling the
regulatory process is the goal of those implementing regulatory
reform, but others have made this claim explicit, dubbing the
phenomena “[p]aralysis by [a]nalysis.”21
In a study of the notice-and-comment process, West noted the
work of other scholars who have placed the possible impacts of
procedures required of agencies issuing regulations into three
categories.22 Procedures can have the substantive impacts with which
17.

John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?:
The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy 35
(2002).

18.

Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative
Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency
Costs, 75 Va. L. Rev. 499, 501–04 (1989).

19.

McGarity, supra note 3, at 1396–1436.

20. Id. at 1436–43.
21.

David C. Vladeck & Thomas O. McGarity, Paralysis by Analysis: How
Conservatives Plan to Kill Popular Regulation, Am. Prospect, Summer
1995, at 78.

22.

William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes,
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 Pub. Admin. Rev. 66, 67–68 (2004).
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they are justified (more efficient regulations, greater responsiveness to
public preferences, favoring particular constituencies).23 Procedures
can have a political impact facilitating the influence of political
officeholders24 (although this could be divided into two categories: the
influence of the enacting coalitions that put the procedures in place25
or the existing coalition that oversees their use26). Or finally, they can
have a merely symbolic impact, giving support to the values they are
said to embody but having little impact on policy.27
Which of these roles have regulatory reforms played? Once a
backwater of political science and administrative law research,28
empirical work on the regulatory process has flowered over the past
decade. Much of this work has focused on the federal regulatory
process. There have been examinations of the public comment
process, the role of cost-benefit analysis, and executive review. Below,
we briefly summarize the empirical literature that looks at the role
procedural constraints play in regulatory decision-making.29 After a
discussion of the various studies of the different constraints on the
federal regulatory process, we turn to the much sparser literature on
the regulatory process in the states.
A.

Public Participation

The area of the regulatory process that has received the most
attention is the oldest regulatory reform: the notice-and-comment
process. While participation requirements go as far back as
regulations, notice-and-comment in its modern form was created by
the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.30 Agencies are required to
propose their regulations publicly, provide time for public comment,
and then respond to the comments in the preamble to their final
23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 4, at 253–
55 (discussing how politicians can use administrative procedure to affect
outcomes and induce bureaucratic compliance).

26.

See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 499 (discussing both the potential
for bureaucratic drift and “the influence of subsequent political
coalitions on the development and administration of the law”).

27.

West, supra note 22, at 67–68.

28.

See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1111 (2002) (detailing the growing use of empirical
analysis in administrative law and advocating for its use).

29.

Each of the discussions on the individual procedural controls below is by
necessity a brief summary. A literature review of each type of procedure
could take up an article length discussion on its own.

30.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).

1797

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Exploring the Relationship Between Regulatory Reform in
the States and State Regulatory Output

rules.31 Courts have required the responses by agencies to be nondismissive, but agencies are in no way bound to adopt the suggestions
of commenters.
Studies of agency responsiveness to comments have found that
agencies are likely to respond to comments submitted by the public
only in certain limited circumstances. Golden found that agencies
were not likely to modify their proposals except when commenters
with opposing perspectives agreed on an issue.32 West studied fortytwo rulemakings and concluded that the primary role of the public
comment process was to highlight issues for political overseers—
confirming, to some degree, the McNollgast view—but even this was
limited in its impact.33 Yackee concluded that “interest group
comments can and often do affect the content of final government
regulations.”34
One form of participation that has garnered a fair amount of
academic attention is regulatory negotiation. Reg-neg, as it is often
called, requires agencies to sit down with the parties affected by a
regulation and negotiate the contents of the rule. Considerable
dispute exists about the effectiveness of reg-neg. Advocates of the
process, such as Harter, argue that the process saves time and reduces
litigation over regulation.35 Coglianese, in an empirical assessment,
examined a series of regulatory negotiations and found that the
purported benefits of the process have not materialized.36

31.

Id.

32.

Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process:
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. Pub. Admin. Res.
& Theory 245, 259–62 (1998).

33.

West, supra note 22, at 73; see also Steven J. Balla, Administrative
Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 663, 671–732 (1998) (concluding that the Health Care Financing
Administration disfavored comments from the physicians that the
reform was intended to help).

34.

Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. Pub.
Admin. Res. & Theory 103, 119 (2005).

35.

Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32, 32–45 (2000); Philip
J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?, 3 Envtl.
Impact Assessment Rev. 75, 80–84 (1982).

36.

Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255, 1334–36 (1997) (stating
that the EPA, the agency that has used the process the most, did not
see time savings and still finds the negotiated rules challenged in court);
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A
Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 386, 445–47 (2001)
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B.

Legislative and Executive Review

Because of the Supreme Court decision INS v. Chadha,37 which
overturned the one-house congressional veto, legislative review of
agency regulatory decisions is nearly non-existent at the federal level.
The Congressional Review Act was passed in 199638 as a replacement,
but because it requires a presidential signature, and a president is
very unlikely to agree to veto a regulation issued by his own
administration, the CRA has been used only one time. That
instance—a regulation promulgated at the end of one administration
with a succeeding Congress and president of the opposing party—will
very rarely be repeated.39
Executive review at the federal level is justifiably the subject of
much more attention. Schultz Bressman and Vandenbergh surveyed
employees of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and used
their survey results to argue that review by the president’s staff—
including but not limited to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)—has been experienced by EPA employees as interference in
their pursuit of policy goals.40 This agrees with earlier criticisms of
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as
biased in an anti-regulatory direction.41 Most of the criticisms of
executive oversight, however, are based on individual case studies.
Justice Kagan, drawing on her experience at the Domestic Policy
Council under President Clinton, argued that presidential control
helped in coordination of executive branch activities, and to overcome
(responding to Philip Harter’s criticism of the author’s research and
further explaining the downsides of negotiated rulemaking).
37.

462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).

38.

Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 847, 868 (1996) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012)).

39.

Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of
the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act:
Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 Admin. L.
Rev. 707, 724–30 (2011).

40.

See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential
Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 91–99 (2006) (detailing problems with
transparency, a lack of unification of review, selectivity in the rules
chosen, poor timing, and a misplaced focus on costs).

41.

See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
1059, 1064–71 (1986) (claiming that the system of review “places the
ultimate rule-making decisions in the hands of OMB personnel” and
that the “Executive Order allows OMB to cut off all investigations
before they even begin, making it nearly impossible to attack OMB’s
decision”).
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bureaucratic pathologies, such as devotion to mission or torpor.42
Demuth, a former OIRA Administrator, argues that OIRA’s influence
has been overstated and that its impact has been minimal.43 The most
detailed empirical study was by Croley, who examined data on OMB
review and concluded that the White House used the review process
to have a greater influence over agency rulemaking, focusing on fewer
rules over the years while requiring a change in a greater percentage,
though in an apparently evenhanded way that did not work to the
advantage of certain types of interests.44
C.

Economic Analysis

Closely tied (at least on the federal level) to executive review is
the requirement that federal agencies engage in a form of cost-benefit
analysis for a certain subsection of their regulations.45 Many agency
regulatory decisions are also subject to requirements that they
examine the economic impact of their decision on particular
constituencies such as small businesses. Opponents of cost-benefit
analysis have argued that it has weakened regulations, although such
arguments are usually theoretical rather than empirical.46 Wagner uses
an EPA analysis to argue that Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)
42.

See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2334–45 (discussing how the Reagan and
Clinton Administrations adeptly “used their administrative control to
drive a resistant bureaucracy and political system”).

43.

See Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 15, 20
(2011) (stating that “the result of these thirty years of skirmishing has
been only marginal improvements in regulatory policy”).

44.

See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 851, 882–83 (2003)
(noting that the “Clinton OIRA focused on fewer rules” yet “required a
change in a much higher percentage of the rules it reviewed” and that
“the White House clearly has used rulemaking review to put its own
mark on particular agency rules,” but it has done so in an “evenhanded
way”).

45.

Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to perform a Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) on all regulations with an economic impact of
more than $100 million in any year. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
638 (1993).

46.

See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 8
(2004) (“The new trend toward economic critique of health and
environmental protection has caught on in every branch of the federal
government—within the White House, in Congress, and even in the
courts. Environmental advocates, decision makers, and citizens
concerned about the environment often find themselves on the defensive,
without an effective response to the arcane arguments and imposing
data offered to show why, when it comes to protective regulation, less is
better.”).
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are used to justify regulations more often than influence the policy
decisions embedded in the regulation.47 This comports with an
analysis by Shapiro, which argues that the requirement for costbenefit analysis, because it is tied to executive review, has always
taken a back seat to the political needs of the president.48
Shapiro and Morrall analyzed a series of rules and their
underlying analyses and found no appreciable relationship between
the extent of the information provided in the analysis and the net
benefits of the rule. On the other hand, they found that political
factors such as the salience of the rule and whether it was a midnight
regulation did correlate with net benefits. This finding (and the others
above on cost-benefit analysis) cast doubt on the ability of regulatory
analysis to have the effects that many proponents expect.49
D.

Deadlines and Delay

The use of deadlines to constrain bureaucratic discretion has
received much less attention than other types of regulatory reforms.
The one significant analysis is by Gersen and O’Connell. They found
that deadlines do shorten the amount of time it takes to complete a
rule for an agency but also that deadlines lead to reductions in public
participation and that agencies frequently miss deadlines—thereby
calling into question whether the deadlines are effective.50
The McGarity argument that regulatory reforms and judicial
review have combined to cripple agency regulators and deter them
from issuing regulations has recently received increased empirical
attention.51 McGarity himself relied on a case study of the National
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) that indicated
that the agency had moved away from rulemaking and instead was
47.

Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy
Analysis, in RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Reforming Regulatory
Impact Analysis 56–82 (Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling &
Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009).

48.

Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive
Review of Regulations, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 10433–44 (2005); see also
Donald R. Arbuckle, The Role of Analysis on the 17 Most Political
Acres on the Face of the Earth, 31 Risk Analysis 884–92 (2011).

49.

Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory
Politics: Benefit–Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 Reg. &
Governance 189 (2012).

50.

Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative
Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 945–46, 956–59 (2008) (discussing how
deadlines may shorten the length of time needed to complete a proposed
law, but those effects are sometimes outweighed by the deterrent to
public participation).

51.

McGarity, supra note 3.
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relying upon recalls of cars to implement policy.52 Other occasional
case studies and accounts in the popular press have cited examples of
regulations that have taken years to complete.53
Non-academic studies of the numbers of rules and academic
empirical analyses have been arrayed against the ossification
argument. In the former category are annual studies by the
Competitive Enterprise Institute that show that the number of
regulations issued by the federal government has been steady or even
increasing despite the increased proceduralization of the regulatory
process.54 Kerwin and Furlong analyzed EPA regulations and found
that the time to complete a regulation varied considerably and
unpredictably.55 More recently, Coglianese cast doubt on the original
analysis of NHTSA,56 and Johnson argued that ossification has not
been a problem at EPA.57 In the most detailed analysis of the time it
takes agencies to complete a rule, Yackee and Yackee showed that for
a data set composed of rules across agencies, those regulations that

52.

Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto
Safety 165–71 (1990).

53.

See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Two Years Later, OSHA’s Rule to Protect
Workers from Deadly Silica Still in White House Review, CPR Blog
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.progressivereform.org/ CPRBlog.cfm?
idBlog=D913A772-BAB5-697D-6638AEC1CF3053DB (discussing the
importance of and the length of time to complete the OSHA proposed
rule “requiring employers in the mining, manufacturing and construction
industries to protect their employees from silica dust particles as they
engage in such activities as sandblasting, cutting rocks and concrete,
and jackhammering”)).

54.

See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Competitive Enterprise Inst., Ten
Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the
Regulatory State 43–45 (2012), available at http://cei.org/sites/
default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%2010,000%20Commandments%
202012_0.pdf 2012 (last viewed Feb. 26, 2014) (providing annual
Federal Register page histories and detailing the number of final and
proposed rules in each volume).

55.

See generally Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and
Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. Pub. Admin. Res. &
Theory 113, 116 (1992) (discussing the time it takes to complete rules,
suggesting generally “that the time it takes to write rules is a function
of variations in both the complexity of the subject matter and the
effects of legal, bureaucratic, and political variables on the rulemaking
process”).

56.

Cary Coglianese, Has Judiicial Review Caused a Rulemaking Retreat?,
Presentation at The Law and Society Conference (May 25, 2009).

57.

Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?: An Empirical Analysis of
EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767 (2008).
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had to go through certain procedures (such as OIRA review) actually
were completed more quickly than rules that did not.58
E.

Studies of the States

The foregoing studies all examine regulation on the federal level.
There are good reasons that scholars have focused on the federal
government. Federal regulations have extremely large impacts, with
some reaching costs and benefits in billions of dollars. The federal
government has largely been at the forefront of reforming the
regulatory process with ideas filtering down to the states rather than
bubbling up from them. And finally, with the Federal Register and
Unified Agenda online for more than a decade (and public comments
available through regulations.gov), and regular reports to Congress on
the impacts of regulation, data on the federal regulatory process has
been far more plentiful than data in the states.
But in the past several years, a number of studies of state
regulations have begun to surface. With a much greater variety of
regulatory processes and political climates, the states are potentially
fertile ground for researchers attempting to better understand the
effect of regulatory procedures. And while federal regulations are
individually more significant than any state regulation, collectively,
states regulate twenty percent of the U.S. economy59—arguing for
better understanding of how state regulations are created.
Several of the studies echo the results on the federal level that
cast doubt about the influence of regulatory reforms on regulatory
decisions. Whisnant and DeWitt Cherry looked at the use of costbenefit analysis in North Carolina and raised questions about its
application there.60 They speculated that limited capacity and
commitment restricted the ability of states to use analysis to influence
regulations. Shapiro found that procedural controls had little impact
on the development of child care licensing standards in eight states.61
Shapiro and Borie-Holtz, in a case study on regulatory reform in New

58.

Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures
and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”? 20
J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 261 (2009).

59.

Paul Teske, Regulation in the States 9 (2004).

60.

Richard Whisnant & Diane DeWitt Cherry, Economic Analysis of
Rules: Devolution, Evolution, and Realism, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev.
693 (1996).

61.

See generally Stuart Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks: Procedural
Controls and Regulatory Change, 12 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory
29 (2002) (discussing how in eight states, the regulation of child care
was affected much more heavily by interest groups, legislators, and
executives than by procedural controls).
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Jersey, also found limited effects for many different regulatory
procedures.62
On the other hand, Teske argued that “much of the evidence
here, consistent with the findings of other studies of state regulation,
demonstrates that government regulatory institutions do shape state
regulatory policy outcomes in important ways.”63 This is to some
degree supported by several works relying upon surveys of state
officials about the perceived influence of the political branches of
government. Perceived influence is of course distinct from actual
influence but is still informative. In a 2004 article, Woods found that
agency officials perceived gubernatorial oversight as more effective
than legislative review.64 He followed up in a 2005 article showing that
stronger political branches led to decreased perceptions of interest
group influence.65 Woods also concluded that provisions broadening
access and notification to the rulemaking process increased the
perception of influence of outside actors, particularly the courts and
interest groups. Also using survey data, Dometrius looked at
gubernatorial oversight and concluded that oversight (or at least what
bureaucrats perceived as oversight) was effective when the governor
had higher approval ratings.66
Legislative influence has been of particular interest on the state
level, perhaps because meaningful legislative review is absent on the
federal level. Teske says that “[l]egislatures play an important role
when they are directly making regulatory policy themselves or when
they are overseeing regulatory policies that are largely developed (via

62.

Stuart Shapiro & Deborah Borie-Holtz, Lessons from New Jersey: What
Are the Effects of “Administrative Procedures” Regulatory Reform?,
Reg. Spring 2011, at 14–19.

63.

Teske, supra note 59, at 29–30.

64.

See Neal D. Woods, Political Influence on Agency Rule Making:
Examining the Effects of Legislative and Gubernatorial Rule Review
Powers, 36 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 174, 182 (2004) (concluding that
“while gubernatorial rule review powers significantly increase the
reported influence of the governor, all else constant, legislative rule
review powers do not have a significant effect”).

65.

See Neal D. Woods, Interest Group Influence on State Administrative
Rule Making: The Impact of Rule Review, 35 Am. Rev. Pub. Admin.
402, 403 (2005) (concluding that “greater legislative or gubernatorial
rule review authority will reduce interest group influence by providing
an institutional means to counteract subsystem politics”).

66.

See Nelson C. Dometrius, Gubernatorial Approval and Administrative
Influence, 2 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 251, 261 (2002) (concluding that
“[a] governor’s approval rating does make a difference in how state
agencies respond to him or her,” improving the effectiveness of
gubernatorial oversight of rulemaking).
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rule making) and implemented by state bureaucratic agencies.”67 The
literature shows mixed results for the impact of legislative review.68
An article in the Harvard Law Review examined legislative review in
Connecticut and Alaska and showed that it did result in changes to
agency regulations.69 Ethridge examined legislative review in three
states and found that stricter rules were more likely to be reviewed
(but did not analyze the effect on the reviewed regulations).70 Finally,
Hahn examined both economic analysis and legislative review. He
found many requirements but little evidence that the requirements
had improved regulatory outcomes.71
The studies above do not give a definitive answer as to whether
regulatory reforms have substantive impacts, play a role that
facilitates political oversight, or are largely symbolic.72 However, the
balance of the studies cast the most severe doubt on the first of these
three options. Few of the studies above showed procedures having a
clear impact on policy decisions. Those that did measured the impacts
as perceived by agency actors rather than changes in policy.73 In what
follows we try to use a database of regulatory reforms and regulatory
outputs to help clarify the role of regulatory reforms. First, we should
describe our data.

II. Data
We collected data on all rules issued in 2007 from the twentyeight states74 that put data about final regulations online.75 Although
67.

Teske, supra note 59, at 198.

68

Id.

69.

Note, Oversight and Insight: Legislative Review of Agencies and Lessons
from the States, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 613, 628, 630 (2007).

70.

Marcus E. Ethridge, A Political-Institutional Interpretation of
Legislative Oversight Mechanisms and Behavior, 17 Polity 340, 356
(1984).

71.

Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative
Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 873, 884 (2000).

72.

West, supra note 22, at 67.

73.

See, e.g., Schultz Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 40, at 99;
Woods, supra note 64, at 179; Woods, supra note 65, at 408.

74.

Data was collected from twenty-eight states for which regulations were
available online at the time: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

75.

A natural question is whether states that put their rules online differ in
some meaningful way from states that do not. As described below, we
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not a full examination of all fifty states, we tested for discernible bias
and believe the states we looked at provide a representative sample of
rulemaking activity in 2007. The final rules we studied were collected
from states in all four census regions of the country: nine states from
the Midwest, five states from the Northeast, and seven states each
from the South and the West regions. Within each region, the Census
Bureau further stratifies states into divisions, putting two divisions in
each region, with the exception of the South, which has three regions.
The data was collected from states in all nine census divisions. Thus,
while we do not have California, Texas, and Florida in our database,
the states we did examine are a representative sample of the nation as
a whole.
The states are also representative politically. The state legislature
was governed by Democrats in eleven of the states in 2007, by
Republicans in eight, and was split between the two parties in nine of
the states in our data set. It was more lopsided in the governor’s
mansion where twenty-one of the twenty-eight states were governed
by Democrats (the 2006 elections swept Democrats into statehouses
nationwide). Eleven of the states voted for John Kerry for President
in 2004 and seventeen of them voted for George W. Bush.
Finally, as for our key independent variable, the presence of
procedures to control agency regulatory actions, our states represent
an excellent cross section. As described below, in the discussions of
the three key regulatory reforms, executive control of rulemaking,
legislative control of rulemaking, and economic analysis requirements,
all three variables have scores across our entire spectrum for the
stringency of the control.76
A.

Dependent Variable—How Many Rules?

Regulatory output is not a perfect proxy for the impact of
regulations. However, there are a number of characteristics that make
it a useful dependent variable. First, a central claim of those opposing
regulatory reforms is that such reforms make it harder to regulate.77 If
the cost of writing a regulation has risen for agencies, then it follows
that fewer regulations will be produced (unless agency resources are
increasing but those cases are few and far between). Therefore,
tested for discernible bias and could not find any meaningful differences
between states in our sample and states not in it.
76.

One possible difficulty is the existing regulatory base in the states. Some
states may issue more regulations because they have issued fewer
regulations in the past and are merely “catching up” with their peers.
While we do not think this is the case, it is extremely difficult to test
and therefore to rule out.

77.

See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 3, at 1398.
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examining the effect of regulatory reforms on regulatory output
provides a direct test of the argument that reform dampens output
and one side of the argument that reforms have a substantive impact
on regulation.
As for the other side of the argument—whether reforms lead to
more effective regulations—the connection between output and
impact is less strong but still viable. Critics of regulation often cite
the number of regulations and conflate it with regulatory stringency
in the public mind and in political rhetoric.78 Moreover, most
regulations do impose a constraint on private action and hence the
volume of regulatory activity has often served as a proxy for
regulatory burden.79 In addition, we find a statistically significant
reverse correlation (-0.37) between the number of regulations in a
state and the “regulatory freedom” in that state as measured by
Sorens and Ruger.80 This indicates that having more regulations does
correlate with regulatory stringency and hence has some validity as a
measure of stringency. The relationship between the volume of
rulemaking and the stringency is unlikely to be perfect but it also
strikes us that these two variables are likely to be related (more
regulations are likely to indicate a more stringent regulatory regime).81
While we report the total number of rules (8961 rules in the
twenty-eight states), this measure does not serve well as a dependent
variable for state regulatory activity. States use rulemaking in
different ways. For example, most states use rulemaking to administer
their Medicaid program, with some states issuing more than fifty
78.

Crews, supra note 54, at 40.

79.

Indeed, rulemaking output at the federal level tends to increase in
Democratic administrations and decrease in Republican administrations.
This has so far not held for the Obama Administration. Id. at 39.
Rulemaking output also increases in the last year of an administration
when agencies tend to promulgate costly rules. See Jack M. Beermann,
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 352,
352
(2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2009/9/LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf.

80.

William P. Ruger & Jason Sorens, Freedom in the 50 States 2013: Index
of Personal and Economic Freedom, STATEPOLICYINDEX, http://
www.statepolicyindex.com/freedom-in-the-50-states/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2013).

81.

Recent work by Michael Mandel and Diana G. Carew has argued that
the sheer number of regulations may have important deleterious effects
apart from the impact of any individual regulation. Michael Mandel &
Diana G. Carew, Regulatory Improvement Commission: A
Politically-Viable Approach to U.S. Regulatory Reform 3–9
(2013),
available
at
http://www.progressivepolicy.org/2013/05/
regulatory-improvement-commission-a-politically-viable-approach-to-u-sregulatory-reform/.
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“Medicaid rules” in 2007. However, some states do not use rulemaking
for Medicaid, meaning that the total number of rules means different
things in different states.
To deal with this problem, we borrowed a concept from the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs. We separated out rules with a
real economic impact on society from “budgetary” rules that govern
programs, like Medicaid, which merely disburse funds. We also
eliminated rules that set the hunting season for various animals,
because the extent to which states use rulemaking for this purpose
varies considerably between states. Finally we also eliminated purely
administrative regulations that set rules for the state government, not
the public. This left us with a variable we called “economic rules,” or
rules that impose an economic constraint on private action, which
totaled 5356 rules for the twenty-eight states. The total for each state
is in Table 1. This reflects a more adequate measure of the regulatory
activity in each state in 2007.
We note that our “economic rules” variable incorporates what
scholars of regulation call “social regulations” (regulations designed to
curb externalities or information asymmetries in order to improve
public health) as well as “economic regulations” (regulations that
restrict the price or quantity of goods or services). Both of these types
of regulations restrict private behavior and hence have an
economic effect.
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Table 1: Rules per State in 2007

State
Arizona
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
TOTAL

2007
Total Rules
145
298
191
229
381
218
463
113
542
418
64
72
184
160
674
324
474
546
681
152
508
77
78
281
367
993
134
194
8961

Rules with an
Economic Impact
93
131
140
145
183
85
254
62
219
246
58
36
126
70
562
197
371
319
514
110
274
44
45
172
237
484
99
80
5356

While the procedures that we examine affect all regulations issued
in a state, there is reason to believe that they will act differently in
different policy areas. The politics surrounding an issue vary by policy
area and, therefore, the role of regulatory reforms and of political
actors may vary.82 The very nature of certain procedures may lead to
82.

See generally, The Politics of Regulation (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1980) (discussing different areas in which the government regulates).
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different impacts in different policy areas. Cost-benefit analysis is
harder or easier depending on the nature of the question being
analyzed. Deadlines are more relevant when the policy question being
answered is more complicated.
There were five policy areas that were common to the vast
majority of states we examined. These policy areas also made up a
significant portion of total number of economic regulations that we
used as our aggregate dependent variable. The five policy areas are
environment, transportation, agriculture, insurance and banking, and
education. For each of the analyses conducted below, we report the
results in aggregate and then note if there are any differences in the
five policy areas. If there is no mention of the specific policy areas,
then the results were the same as the aggregate results.
B.

Independent Variables: Procedural Controls

If there is no relationship between the presence of procedures and
the level of regulatory output, then do other factors in the political
environment explain regulatory output at the states? Horn and
Shepsle argued that coalitions that put procedures in place to control
bureaucratic drift leave themselves open to changes in who holds the
political reins or “coalitional drift.”83 Are existing coalitions able to
enforce their will over state agencies, regardless of the procedural
environment in which they operate?
We collected data on the regulatory process for each state,
including data on executive and legislative review, requirements for
impact analyses, rulemaking deadlines, and sunset provisions.84 During
our data collection process, the Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI)
issued a detailed report on the role of executive and legislative review,
impact analysis, and sunset provisions in the states. The IPI report
was based on data collection and interviews in all fifty states. For
each procedural requirement that they studied, they compared the
legal requirements with the practice in each state.85 This data was far
more extensive than anything previously available and became the
primary source for our data on these regulatory reforms.
For legislative review, executive review, and impact analysis, we
developed ten-point scales for the extent of the reach of each
procedure in each state in our database. The ten-point scale for each
83.

Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 502–04.

84.

Because each state requires a public comment period, there was little
data to collect on this aspect of rulemaking. We did collect data on
whether states require agencies to respond to comment but, as described
below, found no significant relationship between that requirement and
regulatory output.

85.

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 146–395.
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of these variables is detailed in the Appendix. The scores were based
on the descriptions in the IPI report.86 Several scales on legislative
review had been developed (prior to the issuance of the IPI report).
Our scale has a correlation coefficient of 0.62 with Gerber, Maestas,
and Dometrius’ scale87 and a correlation coefficient of 0.63 with the
scale developed by Grady and Simon.88 These correlation coefficients
indicate that our legislative review scale possesses external validity.
Agreement with the executive review scale developed by Grady
and Simon was less strong with a correlation coefficient of 0.47. This
value is still statistically significant (using a two-tailed t-test at the
five percent confidence level). Further, detail on executive review
before the IPI report was harder to access because much of it is
informal (as opposed to legislative review, which is often in statute),
so we believe our data (really, IPI’s data) on executive review is the
best available. We also collected dichotomous data on whether or not
states require a written response to agency comments,89 whether
agencies sunset their rules, and whether they place a deadline
on rulemaking.
C.

Independent Variables: Politics

We collected data on political variables in each state in an effort
to control for differences in political preferences for regulation. First,
we measured for differences in political culture, which was defined by
the general election vote for president in the 2004 cycle. We also
collected data on the partisan control of the governor’s office and
both chambers of the legislature in 2007 and further noted those
instances where control of the legislature was divided. With the
exception of two states, New Jersey and Virginia, state legislatures
elect their members in even numbered years; therefore, the 2007
legislature was the first year of a new session for most states. Given
the likelihood that some rules finalized in 2007 resulted from
lawmaking in the prior session, we also took a look at partisan control
in 2006. While individual members may have changed, the partisan
make-up of the states changed only slightly in 2007 as compared to
86.

Id. at 91–141.

87.

Brian J. Gerber et al., State Legislative Influence over Agency
Rulemaking: The Utility of Ex Ante Review, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 24
(2005).

88.

Dennis O. Grady & Kathleen M. Simon, Political Restraints and
Bureaucratic Discretion: The Case of State Government Rule Making,
30 POL. & POL’Y 646 (2002).

89.

All states require public comment, so there is no variation in this
requirement, which makes it impossible to use as an independent
variable. How well states respond to comment may vary, but collecting
that data for this volume of regulations is impossible.
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2006. In six states, the partisan control shifted from a single party
control to split control;90 only New Hampshire shifted from
Republican control in 2006 to Democratic control in 2007.

III. Analysis
This section is broken up by the categories of independent
variables. First, we discuss the role of procedures in regulatory
output, and then the role of politics. With a sample size of twentyeight states, our ability to use multiple independent variables is
limited. After the comparisons of individual variables, a third
subsection below includes some simple multivariable analyses. Given
the limited number of correlations found in the first two sections, the
likelihood that significant relationships would be found in a
multivariate analysis is limited.
A.

Administrative Procedures

The twenty-eight states we examined provide considerable
variation in their use of regulatory procedures, which allows for an
examination of their effects that extends beyond what scholars have
studied previously. In this Part, we describe the interaction between
six types of procedures and rulemaking output. As described above,
three of these variables are constructed as a ten-point scale: executive
review, legislative review, and economic analysis. The other three
variables are yes/no variables: sunset requirements, deadlines for
finalizing rules, and the requirement that agencies respond
to comments.
B.

Executive Review

As described in the Appendix, the ten-point scale for the
executive review variable is made up of four components. These four
are (1) whether the review is required or optional, (2) whether it is
binding or non-binding, (3) who conducts the review (the governor’s
office or another office in the executive branch), and (4) the criteria
for the review. The average score for the twenty-eight states is a 5.5
and the median score is a six. There was considerable clustering near
the ends of the scale, with ten states receiving a zero and six states
receiving a ten.
The correlation coefficient for the total number of rules, for the
number of economic rules, and for the number of rules in each of the
90.

Of the six states that saw party shifts in the legislative chambers,
Indiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin went from Republican
control in 2006 to split partisan leadership of the chambers in 2007.
Iowa and Minnesota went from Democratic control in 2006 to split
control in 2007.
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five policy areas, with the level of executive review was negative but
small and statistically insignificant91 (-0.19 and -0.16 respectively for
total rules and economic rules). The negative correlation is expected
as executive review is criticized as one of the procedures that often
deters rulemaking. The small magnitude and statistical insignificance
of the relationship seems to indicate that, by itself, executive review
does not dissuade agencies from engaging in rulemaking.
However, if one examines the six states that scored a ten in the
Executive Review variable,92 a possible relationship emerges. The
average number of economic rules in these six states was ninety-eight
rules, but the average for the other twenty-two states was 216 rules
(breaking out the ten states that scored zero showed no relationship
with the level of rulemaking). This difference was statistically
significant at the five percent level93 using a one-sided t-test and may
show that, in its most extreme forms, executive review has an impact
on the level of rulemaking. However, we should note that of these six
states, three had Republican governors and two of the other three had
legislatures controlled by Republicans. This may indicate that existing
coalition control provides a more compelling explanation for
rulemaking volume.
C.

Legislative Review

Like the executive review variable, the ten-point scale for the
legislative review variable has several components. Review is
considered more stringent if it is mandatory instead of voluntary, if
legislatures actually have veto authority (without requiring a
governor’s signature), and if there are fewer restrictions on the legal
grounds for legislative disapproval of a regulation. The average review
score is a 5.5 and the median is a five. There are fewer extreme values
for this variable than for the executive review variable, with only
three states with a value of zero94 and two states with a
“perfect” ten.95
The strength of legislative review has no correlation with the
volume of rulemaking in the state. Correlation coefficients were close
to zero for both total rules and economic rules. This was also true for
each of the five policy areas we examined. Six out of thirteen states
91.

Using a one sided t-test.

92.

The states are Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Pennsylvania.

93.

While the direction was the same for each policy area, the relationship
was statistically significant for transportation regulation and
insurance/banking regulation only.

94.

The three states are Arizona, New Mexico, and Delaware.

95.

These two are Tennessee and Illinois.
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with a legislative review score below the median issued more than the
median number of rules in 2007, while six out of fifteen states at or
above the median level of legislative review issued more than the
median number of rules.
D.

Impact Analysis

The final of our three variables with a ten-point scale was the
stringency of impact analysis requirements in the states. States
received a higher score based on the number of rules for which
analysis was required (intermediate scores were given for states that
had a threshold for requiring analysis), for requiring analysis of all
costs and benefits instead of just government impacts, and for the
type and extent of review of the analysis. The mean and median
scores were both six, and three states scored a zero,96 while four states
scored a ten.97
Like legislative review, economic analysis shows no relationship
with the volume of rulemaking. The correlation coefficients for total
number of rules, rules with an economic effect, and rules in all five
policy areas are all nearly zero, and the level of rulemaking for states
with below- and above-the-median analysis scores are virtually
identical. It appears that both economic analysis and legislative
review have no relationship with the number of rules that agencies
promulgate.
E.

Other Procedures

All of the states have some form of notice and comment. Only ten
of the twenty-eight states in the study require that agencies actually
publish responses to agency comments. We hypothesized that
requiring an agency response might deter rulemaking but actually
found no statistically significant relationship. For both the total
number of rules and economic rules, more rules were promulgated in
the ten states with required agency responses than in the eighteen
states that allowed agencies to publish final rules without a response.
The difference is small and not statistically significant, however.
A number of states require agencies to finalize their rules within a
certain period of time after the close of the public comment period.
Sixteen states (out of our twenty-eight) have such deadlines, and the
deadlines vary from seventy-five days after the end of public
comments to two years after the comment period is concluded.
Theoretically, such deadlines should cut down on the number of final
96.

Delaware, New Mexico, and Wyoming have no economic analysis of
regulations.

97.

New York, Virginia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania all received scores of
ten.
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rules because agencies may not be able to finalize all of their
proposals within the prescribed time limits.
Indeed, this is one procedural control that works just as predicted.
States with rulemaking completion deadlines promulgated an average
of 233 rules and 139 economic rules. States without a deadline
promulgated an average of 432 rules and 265 economic rules. The
differences are statistically significant for both variables at the five
percent level. While all five policy areas showed higher levels of
rulemaking in states without deadlines, the relationship was
statistically significant in Education and Agriculture but not in the
other three areas. Still, this is the clearest impact of any
administrative procedure. Placing a deadline on the completion of
agency rulemaking following a proposed rule results in fewer
final rules.
The final procedure we examined was a sunset provision. States
with sunset provisions issue more rules than states without them.
However, this may be because states with sunset provisions have to
undertake rulemaking to re-promulgate sunsetting rules. This alone
could drive up the level of rulemaking in these states.
Overall, looking at the relationship between a single regulatory
reform and the number of economic regulations adopted in these
twenty-eight states, only the requirement of a deadline for completion
showed a moderate to strong and statistically significant relationship.
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Table 2. Correlations among Economic Rules and Regulatory
Reforms
Number of Economic Rules (n=28 states)
Oversight & Analysis

Correlation

p Value

Executive Review

–0.256

0.189

Legislative Review

0.100

0.613

Fiscal Oversight

–0.136

0.491

Time Deadlines

–0.465*

0.013

Sunset Provision

0.181

Response to Comments

0.295

0.357
0.128

Total Scale
–0.181
–0.181
Note: p value is a two-tailed test.
* Significant at 5% level of statistical significance
F.

Political Variables

If enacting coalitions can have only very limited effects on future
agency actions through procedural controls, what about existing
coalitions? We compared the party control of the governor’s office and
the legislature to the level of regulatory output. The clearest impact
was control of the legislature. We collected data on legislative control
in both 2006 and 2007 because, conceivably, agencies could be
engaging in rulemaking to implement statutes passed either by the
current legislature or the previous one. Democratic control of the
legislature correlates with rulemaking volume regardless of the session
of the legislature as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Legislative Control and Regulatory Output
2006
2006
Party
Average
Control of
No. of
Legislature
Rules

2006
Average
No. of
Economic
Rules

2007
2006
Party
Average
Control of
No. of
Legislature
Rules

2007
Average
No. of
Economic
Rules

D (8)

475

258

D (11)

424

231

S (7)

360

250

S (9)

323

219

R (13)

203

119

R (8)

173

104

This speaks volumes to the issue of existing coalition power in
state rulemaking. Democratic control of state legislatures likely
compels rulemaking from agencies more often than Republican
control. Note, we are not measuring whether the substance of the
rules comports with the intent of the legislature. Even without this
data, the level of rulemaking output is highly suggestive of existing
coalition control.
The difference between Democratic and Republican control is
statistically significant at the five percent level (using a one-sided ttest for a difference between the mean number of rules in Democratic
states and Republican states) for legislative control in both 2006 and
2007, and for both total number of rules and for economic rules. If one
includes the cases where control of the legislature was split with those
where Republicans were in control (in effect arguing that control of
one house of the legislature is enough to prevent the passage of
statutes that require regulation), the difference in total rules between
Democratic-controlled legislatures (in 2006 and 2007) and all other
legislatures is statistically significant (again using a one-sided t-test),
but not the difference in economic rules.
All five policy areas exhibited higher levels of regulation under
Democratic-controlled legislatures (both 2006 and 2007) than in
Republican-controlled legislatures. The difference between states with
Democratic and Republican legislatures was statistically significant
for environment, education, and insurance/banking, but not for
transportation or agriculture. If one includes the split legislatures on
either side, the statistical significance disappears in all policy areas.
Why might legislative control be so important in determining
regulatory volume? Regulations have their genesis in laws that
authorize them. Laws are of course the creation of state legislatures.
These results indicate that the control of these legislatures is a
significant determinant of regulatory volume. Democratic legislatures
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are more likely to pass regulatory laws and hence more likely to have
agencies that produce high volumes of regulation.
Interestingly, party control of the governor’s office has little
relationship to the level of rulemaking output. The twenty-one states
with Democratic governors in 2007 issued an average of 310 rules
(with 184 economic rules) compared to 350 (212 economic rules) for
the seven states with Republican governors. The difference is not
statistically significant.
G.

Combinations of Variables

One could come up with a large number of hypotheses about how
combinations of the variables described above could affect rulemaking
output. While our sample size is too small to run regressions with
large numbers of independent variables and get meaningful results, we
can look in detail at combinations of two or three variables. Even
restricting ourselves to such combinations leaves many possibilities,
however. We decided to focus on two types of combinations. First, we
examined whether procedural controls operating together deterred
rulemaking, a claim often voiced by opponents of such procedures.98
Second, we examined party control of the legislature in combination
with legislative review, and party control of the governor’s mansion
with executive review to see if we could shed any light on the
particular impacts of these controls.
H.

Combinations of Procedures

The simplest way to examine the impact of the three main
procedures studied (legislative review, executive review, and economic
analysis) is to add them together. Since all three procedural variables
were given a zero-to-ten scale, adding them together weights them
equally. The correlation between the number of rules (total and
economic) and the combined score for the three procedures is not
statistically significant, casting further doubts on the argument that
procedures deter rulemaking.
We then examined the various combinations of the three controls
to see if any particular combination shows an impact on rulemaking.
Table 4 shows the eight possible combinations (with the median for
each procedural score used to differentiate between states that use the
procedure and states that do not).

98.

See, e.g., Vladeck & McGarity, supra note 21, at 78.
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Table 4. Aggregate State Totals by Analysis Scores
Fiscal
Executive Review
Analysis
Score (Score
Score (Score
Above 6)
Above 6)

Legislative
Review (Score
Above 5)

Average Number
of Economic
Rules (and no. of
states with
> median no. of
economic rules)

Below

Below

Below

235
(2/3 above)

Below

Below

Above

212
(2/7 above)

Below

Above

Below

91
(0/2 above)

Below

Above

Above

167
(1 of 2 above)

Above

Below

Below

306
(2 of 3 above)

Above

Below

Above

197
(1 of 1 above)

Above

Above

Below

197
(2 of 5 above)

Above

Above

Above

108
(1 of 5 above)

The most striking result in Table 4 is that the two highest
average regulatory outputs occur in the states with scores for
executive and legislative review that are below the median and two of
the three lowest outputs occur where they are both above the median.
The sample sizes are small, so appropriate caution should be taken
here. No discernible pattern emerges regarding the use of economic
analysis in combination with the other controls.
We also tested the relationship between rulemaking output and
the combination of deadlines and other controls. It is possible that
deadlines are more of a constraint when agencies have to complete
analyses and go through executive or legislative review as part of the
regulatory process. We found a statistically significant difference (at
the five percent level using a one-sided t-test) between the mean
number of economic rules in states with stringent executive review
and a deadline and states without stringent executive review or a
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deadline.99 States with a deadline and executive review produced fewer
economic rules (92) than deadline states with a deadline and lax
executive review (185). Legislative review and analysis showed
differences in the same direction but did not rise to the level of
statistical significance.
I.

Politics and Procedures

Our final examination of this data involved combinations of the
procedural control variables and political control of the branches of
government.100 First we looked at executive review in combination
with the party of the sitting governor. The results are in Table 5.

99.

This relationship is also statistically significant for insurance/banking,
education, and transportation. States with deadlines and stringent
executive review also produce fewer environmental and agriculture
regulations than states with deadlines and lax review, but the
relationship is not statistically significant. See supra Table 4.

100. We also tested control of the executive and legislative branches in
combination. We found no statistically significant results of interest,
including no difference between divided government and unified
government. See infra Table 5.
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Table 5. Gubernatorial Party Control and Executive Review
Party Control

Executive Review
Score
(Score Above 6)

Average No. of
Economic + Licensing
Regulations
(and no. of states with
> median no. of
economic rules)

D

Below

209
(5/10 above average)

D

Above

162
(4/11 above average)

R

Below

304
(2/4 above but 2
highest)

R

Above

89
(0/3 above average)

The result in the last line is the most interesting. While executive
review by itself seems to show an impact on regulatory output only
when it is at an extreme level (see discussion above), there does seem
to be an important interaction with political control of the
governor’s office.
Specifically, in the three states where a Republican is governor
and there is stringent executive review, a far smaller number of
regulations with an economic impact are issued. This difference is
statistically significant using a one-sided t-test, when comparing these
states with the remaining twenty-five states (at the one percent level)
or with the four states with Republican governors and no executive
review (at the ten percent level). It is possible that executive review
makes little difference if there is a Democratic governor, but that a
Republican governor can use it to stifle regulation.
The situation looks similar but with some important differences
when one examines the individual policy areas. Table 6 reproduces
Table 5 by policy area. Each cell contains the average number of rules
in that policy area.
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Table 6. Gubernatorial Party Control and Executive Review
by Policy Area
Party Control

D

D

R

R

Below 6

Above 6

Below 6

Above 6

Environment

30

22

27

24

Agriculture

13

7

13

24

Insurance/Banking

16

11

18

8

Education

26

18

34

3

Transportation

7

6

21

8

Executive Review
Score (Indicates
Score
Above/Below 6)

As with the aggregate data, three of the five policy areas show the
lowest volume of rulemaking when a Republican is governor and there
is stringent executive review.101 The opposite situation holds for
agriculture, but there is only one state in this category for which we
were able gather data on agricultural rulemaking. Interestingly,
environmental rules, often seen as the most contentious area of
regulation, show no relationship with this combination of
gubernatorial variables.
We also examined legislative review in conjunction with party
control of the legislature. The data is in Table 7.

101. For education, the difference between the last row of the table and the
other rows is significant at the five percent level using a one-sided t-test.
For insurance/banking, it is significant at the ten percent level. See
supra Table 6.
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Table 7. Legislative Review and Legislative Control
Party
Control
(2007)

Legislative Review
Average No. of
Score (Score Above Economic + Licensing Regulations
5)
(and no. of states with > median
no. of economic rules)

D

Below

355
(4/4 above)

D

Above

161
(3/7 above)

R

Below

167
(2/8 above)

R

Above

169
(2/9 above)

Here the difference occurs on the other end of the spectrum.
States in which Democrats control the legislature and there is weak
legislative review tend to have a higher number of regulations. The
difference between this group and the combination of the other three
groups is significant using a one-sided t-test at the five percent level.
Four of the five individual policy areas show the same pattern of
highest rulemaking volume when Democrats control the legislature
and legislative review is limited. The difference rises to statistical
significance, however, only for insurance/banking.
It appears that review by legislatures and executives may make a
difference in regulatory output, but only if the existing coalition uses
the review function. On the executive side, this means that executive
review makes it easier for a Republican governor to dull regulatory
output. Executive review may be helpful but not sufficient to deter
rulemaking. On the legislative side this means that regulatory output
could be restrained either by strong legislative review or by having a
legislature controlled by Republicans. Legislative review may be
sufficient but is not necessary to deter regulation.

Conclusion: Does Regulatory Reform Matter?
A great deal of rhetoric has gone into the debate over regulatory
reform. When new regulatory reforms are passed, tax dollars must be
spent implementing them. And proponents and opponents of
regulatory reform certainly seem to believe that regulatory reforms
matter a great deal; their passage regularly cheers those who believe
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regulations are costly102 and bureaucrats are “out of control,” and
instills fear in those who believe that regulations are necessary to
protect public health and that agency experts should be allowed to
conduct their business unburdened by excessive political oversight.103
At the federal level, numerous academic studies have raised
questions about the efficacy of changes to the regulatory process.104
Furthermore the continual demand for more regulatory reforms (the
113th Congress is considering twenty-three such bills as this Article is
being written)105 should provide evidence that the existing procedures
in place are not doing their job (why pass more regulatory reforms if
the ones already in place are effective?). But, the federal government
is essentially a single case study. The performance of regulatory
reform at the federal level is suggestive but not necessarily
generalizable. The fifty states provide a much broader spectrum in
which to analyze the performance of regulatory reforms.
The data presented above from the states suggest that regulatory
reforms do not fulfill the hopes of their advocates or realize the fears
of their opponents. With one notable exception (deadlines to finalize a
proposed rule), there appears to be little relationship between the
presence of most reforms and the volume of rulemaking in the state.
While volume is an imperfect measure of regulatory policy, the lack of
a relationship contradicts the argument that regulatory procedures
dampen output and casts doubt on the argument that such
procedures will have a predictable substantive impact on future
regulatory policy.
Using West’s typology of the roles of regulatory procedures106 the
data presented here would suggest that that regulatory reforms are
unlikely to have substantive effects. Do they instead play a symbolic
102. See, e.g., David Herszenhorn, DeMint Wants Law to Rein in
Regulations, CAUCUS, (Sept. 22, 2010, 4:37 PM), http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/demint-wants-law-to-rein-in-regulations/
(noting that the Reins Act would “put a stop to the reckless and costly
anti-free market regulations that are destroying jobs”).
103. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, When It REINS, It Pours, New Republic
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/83195/
reins-act-congress-veto-gop (arguing that “U.S. administrative law has
operated from the premise that agency action should be somewhat
insulated from political pressure and horse trading” and that upsetting
that balance would “do serious damage to American health and
prosperity—stopping agencies from promulgating important rules that,
among other things, would help prevent bank failures [and] ensure the
safety of the food we eat”).
104. See supra notes 22–58 and accompanying text.
105. Regulatory Studies Ctr., supra note 1.
106. West, supra note 22.
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or a political role? The data here does not speak definitively to this
question, but it provides some tantalizing clues. Executive review
appears as if it can be used by governors who are opposed to
regulation to facilitate the dampening of regulatory output.
Legislative review can be used similarly. Economic analysis appears to
play a largely symbolic role.
But it is crucial to note that executive and legislative review at
most facilitate control by those in power, not by those who enact
them. In the words of Horn and Shepsle,107 these controls are subject
to coalitional drift. Thus, while they play a role in facilitating political
oversight of regulatory agencies, that role is not predictable in its
substantive direction. Governors who favor regulation may use
executive review to enact their preferences. The same is true for
legislators and legislative review.
Several scholars have noted that other powers possessed by the
executive and the legislature, such as budgetary control and the
appointment power, can be used quite effectively to control agency
outputs.108 If this is true, then regulatory reforms are little more than
a luxury for executives and legislatures looking to control executive
branch agencies. They are another arrow in a relatively full quiver of
mechanisms of control, not the solution to a perceived problem of
agencies issuing regulations willy-nilly.

107. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 499.
108. See George A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making:
Political and Bureaucratic Influences, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 124 (1994); B.
Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of PoliticalBureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497 (1993); B. Dan Wood
& Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991).
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Appendix
Scales for Legislative Review, Executive Review, and Impact Analysis

Executive Review
Who conducts the review?
No one (0)
Within agency only (1)
Outside agency if triggered (2)
Mandatory outside agency (3)
Is review binding?
No (0)
Yes (1)
Who is the outside reviewer?
No one (0)
AG or independent agency (1)
Governor’s office (2)
Criteria for review?
1 point for each for:
Procedural
Legality
Economic
Others
Legislative Review
Nature of review
None (0)
Some regulations (1)
All regulations (2)
Nature of oversight
None (0)
Advisory (1)
Need full vote in both chambers to overturn (2)
Need full vote in one chamber to overturn (3)
Committee can overturn (4)
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Criteria for review
None (0)
Violates state Administrative Procedure Act (1)
Other legal problem or conflict (2)
Impact on certain communities (3)
Any policy reason (4)

Impact Analysis
When is analysis done?
None (0)
If requested by legislature or governor (1)
If requested by public (2)
If $ threshold for effect on budget (3)
If $ threshold for effect on economy (4)
All regulations (5)
Types of impact analyzed
None (0)
On governments (1)
On private sector (2)
Who reviews analysis?
Within agency (0)
Independent review (1)
Scope of review
None (0)
Minimal (1)
Comprehensive (2)
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